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of epidemiological studies of many associations1. On procedures that ‘‘correct’’ for multiple statistical tests
In the very ﬁrst issue of the journal Epidemiology in 1990, Ken
Rothman, editor and founder of the journal, wrote a short article
entitled ‘‘No Adjustments Are Needed for Multiple Comparisons’’
(Rothman, 1990). He argued cogently that statistical procedures
that attempt ‘‘to correct’’ for the investigation of multiple associa-
tions in an epidemiological study, such as Bonferroni procedures,
are patently incorrect. He wrote ‘‘The conventional statistical
doctrine that is designed to ‘correct’ the ‘problem’ of multiple
comparisons is built on two presumptions:1. Chance can not only cause the unusual ﬁnding in principle, but
it does cause many or most such ﬁndings.2. No one would want to earmark for further investigation
something caused by chance.’’
Correcting for multiple tests in a study is an extension of the
test of the null hypothesis for a pair of variables: the extension is
to test the hypothesis that all possible measured associations are
null. This ‘‘‘universal’ null hypothesis presumes that all associa-
tions that we observe (in a given body of data) reﬂect only
random variation (Rothman, 1990).’’ Whereas the assumption
that any two variables may be unrelated is plausible and justiﬁes
adherence to testing the null hypothesis, this ﬁrst presumption
that all associations are random is not justiﬁed and has profound
consequences on our view as to how the universe functions.
Again, quoting Rothman: ‘‘Scientists presume instead that the
universe is governed by natural laws, and that underlying the
variability that we observe is a network of factors related to one
another through causal connections. To entertain the universal
null hypothesis is, in effect, to suspend belief in the real world and
thereby to question the premises of empiricism.’’
The second premise addresses the issue of not wasting
resources on investigating false positive associations. Of course,
in any study one does not know whether an association is causal
or not, regardless of the conﬁdence interval or p-value, and
regardless as to how many associations were investigated. It is
worthwhile recalling Bradford-Hill’s comments written in 1969:
‘‘No formal tests of signiﬁcance can answer these questions [of
causality]y. Beyond that they contribute nothing to the ‘proof’ of
our hypothesis (Bradford-Hill, 1965).’’ Moreover, formal statistical
theory ignores reality: all studies are subject to some errors and
the statistical procedures that we use normally do not take these
into account. Sole reliance on p-values and conﬁdence intervals
can be misleading.51& 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc.
016/j.envres.2011.08.010
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.It is important to recognize that testing procedures that
correct for multiple associations, such as the Bonferroni method,
lower the level of signiﬁcance from the nominal one, say 5%, and
thus will decrease the effective statistical power from the one that
was speciﬁed in the design, thereby increasing the false
negative rate.2. On the design and evaluation of studies
What is of paramount importance in any study, whether it is of
one speciﬁc objective or multiple ones, is whether the study is
designed and conducted ‘‘correctly’’. As Goldberg wrote in Bios-
tatistics in Epidemiology: Design and Basic Analysis, which was
Chapter of 7 of the third edition of Medical Uses of Statistics
(Goldberg et al., 2009):
‘‘In conducting epidemiologic studies and evaluating research
papers y, several principles of research design and conduct are
important in evaluating the data and the analysis. Critical ques-
tions include:1. Are the objectives of the study stated precisely and clearly?
2. Is the study design appropriate for the purpose?
3. Does the study population represent the target population
without appreciable biases in study enrollment, including
sampling of subjects and response rates?4. Were enough subjects enrolled to meet the objectives (i.e., is
there sufﬁcient statistical power to study the problems and
assess the primary questions with adequate precision)?5. Were the measures of outcome and exposure reliable
and valid?6. Are the (possibly implicit) statistical models appropriate?
Namely:
 Do they match the design and the type of outcome variable
used, and are the underlying assumptions at least
approximately true?
 Are known risk factors for the outcome(s) included as
potential confounding variables, and does the research
strategy adequately deal with confounding?
 Were associations among covariates assessed?
 Was effect-modiﬁcation evaluated?
 Are the data used to their fullest extent; could the method
of analysis have caused a loss of information and possibly
distorted the ﬁndings (e.g., transforming a continuous
variable into a binary one; use of logistic regression instead
of ordinal regression for ordinal outcomes)?
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subjects or missing data elements do not bias the ﬁndings?
 Did the reported analysis follow the stated procedures?’’Indeed, these are exactly the types of questions the editors of
Environmental Research ask when we review manuscripts for
publication. It is these questions that investigators need to
consider when designing studies and it is these questions that
reviewers need to consider when evaluating proposals and
manuscripts.
We often see papers in Environmental Research in which
investigators have made use of studies to investigate numerous
hypotheses. Yet, the study of multiple hypotheses appears to be
an anathema in grant review committees. Researchers often see
reviews like one that Goldberg received recently in a case-control
study of breast cancer designed to investigate genetic polymorph-
isms, and occupational and environmental exposures: ‘‘The inves-
tigators are not providing a single hypothesis or research question.
Rather, they are proposing a vast array of research questions since
they are seeking to improve understanding of the role of environ-
mental and occupational risk factors for breast cancer and the role of
genetic factors as well as gene–environment interactions. No aims,
objectives or hypotheses were provided and no one main exposure–
disease association is being considered in this project. While this
broad scope could be considered a strength of this project, since
several different outputs can result from this study, there is also a
weakness with such a wide range of questions. It is possible that since
the investigators have so many possible associations that they are
examining that they will ﬁnd spurious associations by chance.’’ The
fact that Goldberg and his collaborators in a previous study of
breast cancer found a number of important associations (Crouse
et al., 2010; Labreche et al., 2010), which needs to be replicated,
seemed not to matter when the dogma of multiple testing was
applied.3. On reporting associations in an epidemiological study
In the end, one needs to consider carefully how to report
noteworthy associations. In the same issue of Epidemiology of
Rothman’s paper, James Marshall wrote in ‘‘Data dredging and
noteworthiness’’ (Marshall, 1990): ‘‘The epidemiologist has
requested time and effort from subjects to obtain data y. If the
data were gathered well and their potential relevance to an
outcome can be defended, they are worth reporting; they should
be thoroughly dredged. Properly gathered data from a reasonably
sized epidemiological inquiry represent the experience of hun-
dreds, if not thousands of person-yearsy. Basically, then, the ﬁrst
criterion of noteworthiness of a report concerns the relative
quality of the information gathered; whether likely confounders
were addressed, how well exposures and outcomes were mea-
sured, what the investigator did about nonresponse, and the size
of the study.’’ (Although Marshall referred here to the ‘‘size of the
study’’, it is likely that he was really referring to statistical power,
as power depends not just on the number of subjects but also on
the prevalence of exposure and the true magnitude of the effect.)
It does not matter whether many associations are investigated
in one study or across many studies. Speciﬁcally, studies that cast
a wide net across many exposures and outcomes and those that
focus on one association must both meet the following criteria:
no major confounding or selection biases, the ability to measure
accurately the variables under consideration (information), and
adequate statistical power. The issue of statistical power is
essential: low power to detect speciﬁc associations can lead to
false negatives but also can generate aberrant false positives. The
issue of multiple comparisons is a red herring: if one has doneeverything to reduce bias (selection, confounding, information,
and ensuring adequate statistical power for each association) then
it matters not a whit whether there is one objective or a thousand.
Of course, multiple testing procedures should not be used in the
report.
There are many studies, either published in one paper or in
many, that meet the above criteria and for which many associa-
tions have been investigated and many of which have been found
to be noteworthy. Some examples should sufﬁce to illustrate this
point: 173 papers were published from the Nurse’s Health Study
just in 2009 and 2010 alone (http://www.channing.harvard.edu/
nhs/), and the study has led to an understanding of many issues
related to the health of women; data from the American National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES; http://www.
cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes.htm), a cross-sectional study that comprises
a representative sample of the US population, is made available to
investigators and many papers on a wide range of possible
associations have been published (indeed, our Journal has pub-
lished a number of these recently and we never asked the
investigators to invoke any corrections to their testing of hypoth-
eses); the American Cancer Society’s Cancer Prevention Studies
(http://www.cancer.org) were designed to investigate a wide
array of risk factors for cancer. In particular, the second Cancer
Prevention Study has been particularly useful in providing esti-
mates of risk for cancer and for cardiovascular disease in relation
to exposure to ambient air pollution. Indeed, the study was never
designed initially for that purpose, but was used by Doug Dock-
ery, Arden Pope and their colleagues for this express purpose
(Dockery et al., 1993; Pope et al., 2002, 1995). The study has
become one of the most important for setting air quality stan-
dards and the ﬁndings from this study have been corroborated in
others (Chen et al., 2008).
It should be obvious from these examples that every cohort
study in which multiple outcomes are assessed (e.g., mortality,
cancer incidence) are explicitly investigating multiple associa-
tions. Case-control studies, which are a variant of the cohort
design, can also do the same.4. On the identiﬁcation of causal associations
It is indeed correct that we do not want to go on wild goose
chases, but as Bradford-Hill noted, we do not want to obscure our
ability to detect associations that should be conﬁrmed or
strengthened by further study, as this philosophy is one that
encourages inaction in the face of important risks to health
(Bradford-Hill, 1965). We rely on many lines of evidence before
making decisions regarding causality or as evidence for support-
ing interventions. We refer the reader to Bradford-Hill, who set
out ‘‘guidelines’’ (Bradford-Hill referred originally to these as
‘‘viewpoints’’) by which to assess associations for possible caus-
ality (Bradford-Hill, 1965). One of the most important guidelines
is repetition. For this reason, we must be concerned that failure to
ﬁnd an association initially may discourage repetition. In addi-
tion, the notion that a study is not ‘‘novel’’ is not relevant, as
replication is essential for the accrual of evidence as to whether
an association is causal. Thus, at our journal, this is not a prime
criterion for rejecting a manuscript for publication. Manuscripts
that summarize the evidence, using structured reviews and meta-
analytic techniques, where applicable, are encouraged.References
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